This book presents a new view point on some problems of semantics within the framework of the Meaning - Text model introduced to linguistics by I. A. Mel'čuk, A. K. Zolkovskij and Ju. D. Apresjan. In addition to some new formalisms and concepts it provides a great number of specific informal semantic analyses and thus gives a good idea of Apresjan's approach to semantics. Zsfassung in engl. Sprache: Types of information for the surface- semantic component of the 'meaning - (...) text' model. Zsfassung in engl. Sprache: Types of information for the surface- semantic component of the 'meaning - text' model. (shrink)

I start with a detailed but partial analysis of a case regarding grade inflation. The case is inspired by the discussion in Crumbley et al. (2010) and its elaboration in Roberts (2016). I supplement the case description by introducing certain facts that are not in the original discussion. The subsequent analysis is based on this enriched case description. I then raise a number of objections against my analysis. An important metaethical, methodological question emerges while responding to these objections. To (...) what extent are characterizations of moral situations and their descriptions independent from moral commitments? Is there a neutral concept of moral relevance? I argue that we do not have a theory-neutral concept of moral relevance, and that case descriptions essentially presuppose moral commitments. From my moral perspective, as this perspective is reflected in the enriched case description I utilize, the original case description of grade inflation already involves utilizing the wrong moral perspective or theory. (shrink)

Aristotle's well-known divisions of friendship, those based on utility, pleasure and virtue, are based on the kind of good each provides. It is fairly easy to see what is contributed by utility- and pleasure-friendships, but virtue-friendship presents a special difficulty. Aristotle writes that virtue-friendship occurs between good (virtuous) persons, each of whom is happy because of that goodness. Aristotle also asserts, however, that the good (happy) person, especially the philosopher, is largely self-sufficient, needing little in the way of external goods (...) for his happiness. Such a person is virtuous not only in the moral sense but intellectually, having developed the capacities of the mind to make effective moral decisions and, in the case of the philosopher, to contemplate the most divine of subjects. If that is the case, it is not difficult to see why such a person would not need many utility- or pleasure-friends, but why would he need virtue-friends? What does virtue-friendship contribute to the happiness of one who is already happy? Possible answers to those questions have been provided by a number of commentators, whose views will be considered below. I believe their answers can be classified into three general types of argument: the �opportunity argument�, the �reassurance argument� and the �pleasure argument�. Although all of these have their merits, each has pitfalls. There is another possible answer, an �essentialist argument�, which more accurately describes Aristotle's view. I will argue that virtue-friends come to understand each other's true selves, and each, through the awareness and contemplation of the other, becomes a better human being and, consequently, happier. (shrink)

The objective of the study was to investigate the relationship between childhood IQ of parents and characteristics of their adult offspring. It was a prospective family cohort study linked to a mental ability survey of the parents and set in Renfrew and Paisley in Scotland. Participants were 1921-born men and women who took part in the Scottish Mental Survey in 1932 and the Renfrew/Paisley study in the 1970s, and whose offspring took part in the Midspan Family study in 1996. There (...) were 286 offspring from 179 families. Parental IQ was related to some, but not all characteristics of offspring. Greater parental IQ was associated with taller offspring. Parental IQ was inversely related to number of cigarettes smoked by offspring. Higher parental IQ was associated with better education, offspring social class and offspring deprivation category. There were no significant relationships between parental IQ and offspring systolic blood pressure, diastolic blood pressure, cholesterol, glucose, lung function, weight, body mass index, waist hip ratio, housing, alcohol consumption, marital status, car use and exercise. Structural equation modelling showed parental IQ associated with offspring education directly and mediated via parental social class. Offspring education was associated with offspring smoking and social class. The smoking finding may have implications for targeting of health education. (shrink)

Objects are reminiscent of actions often performed with them: knife and apple remind us on peeling the apple or cutting it. Mnemonic representations of object-related actions (action codes) evoked by the sight of an object may constrain and hence facilitate recognition of unrolling actions. The present fMRI study investigated if and how action codes influence brain activation during action observation. The average number of action codes (NAC) of 51 sets of objects was rated by a group of n = (...) 24 participants. In an fMRI study, different volunteers were asked to recognize actions performed with the same objects presented in short videos. To disentangle areas reflecting the storage of action codes from those exploiting them, we showed object-compatible and object-incompatible (pantomime) actions. Areas storing action codes were considered to positively co-vary with NAC in both object-compatible and object-incompatible action; due to its role in tool-related tasks, we here hypothesized left anterior inferior parietal cortex (aIPL). In contrast, areas exploiting action codes were expected to show this correlation only in object-compatible but not incompatible action, as only object-compatible actions match one of the active action codes. For this interaction, we hypothesized ventrolateral premotor cortex (PMv) to join aIPL due to its role in biasing competition in IPL. We found left anterior intraparietal sulcus (IPS) and left posterior middle temporal gyrus (pMTG) to co-vary with NAC. In addition to these areas, action codes increased activity in object-compatible action in bilateral PMv, right IPS, and lateral occipital cortex (LO). Findings suggest that during action observation, the brain derives possible actions from perceived objects, and uses this information to shape action recognition. In particular, the number of expectable actions quantifies the activity level at PMv, IPL, and pMTG, but only PMv reflects their biased competition while observed action unfolds. (shrink)

Commentary on the Sāṅkhyakārikā of Īśvarakr̥ṣṇa, compendium of the Sāṅkhya school in Hindu philosophy.

Machine generated contents note: Cajal and Consciousness: Introduction. By PEDRO C. MARIJUAN1 -- Part I. Consciousness, One Hundred Years after Textura -- Progress in the Neural Sciences in the Century after Cajal (and the Mysteries -- That Remain). By THOMAS D. ALBRIGHT, THOMAS M. JESSELL, -- ERIC R. KANDEL, AND MICHAEL I. POSNER11 -- Part II. Biological Complexity and the Emergence of Consciousness -- Consciousness, Reduction, and Emergence: Some Remarks. -- By MURRAY GELL-MANN41 -- The Epistemic Paradox of Mind and (...) Matter. By HAROLD J. MOROWITZ50 -- The Conscious Cell. BY LYNN MARGULIS55 -- Complexity and Tinkering. By FRANCOIS JACOB71 -- Consciousness, the Brain, and Spacetime Geometry. By STUART HAMEROFF. 74 -- Consciousness, the Brain, and Spacetime Geometry: An Addendum-Some -- New Developments on the Orch OR Model for Consciousness. -- By ROGER PENROSE105 -- Part III. From Primary to Higher-level Consciousness -- Consciousness: The Remembered Present. By GERALD EDELMAN111 -- Consciousness and the Binding Problem. By WOLF SINGER123 -- Cajal on Neurons, Molecules, and Consciousness. By JEAN-PIERRE CHANGEUX 147 -- A Neuronal Model of a Global Workspace in Effortful Cognitive Tasks. By -- STANISLAS DEHAENE, MICHEL KERSZBERG, AND JEAN-PIERRE -- CHANGEUX152 -- Consciousness and the Brain: The Thalamocortical Dialogue in Health and -- Disease. By RODOLFO LLINAS AND URS RIBARY166 -- The Neuroanatomy of Phenomenal Vision: A Psychological Perspective. -- ByPETRA STOERIG176 -- Co-evolution of Human Consciousness and Language. By MICHAEL A. ARBIB 195 -- From Computing with Numbers to Computing with Words-From -- Manipulation of Measurements to Manipulations of Perceptions. -- By LOTFI A. ZADEH221 -- Part IV. Closing Remarks -- Who Was Cajal? By ALBERTO PORTERA-SANCHEZ253 -- Index of Contributors259 -- Subject Index261. (shrink)

In The Quantum Self, Danah Zohar argues that the insights of modem physics can illuminate our understanding of everyday life -- our relationships to ourselves, to others, and to the world at large. Guiding us through the strange and fascinating workings of the subatomic realm to create a new model of human consciousness, the author addresses enduring philosophical questions. Does the new physics provide a basis by which our consciousness might continue beyond death? How does the material world (for instance, (...) ugly inner cities) impinge upon our sense of self? Is there a subatomic wellspring from which our creativity, our empathy with others, and our feelings of unity with the inanimate world originate?Most important, Zohar shows how the vitality of the new physics combats the alienation and fragmentation of twentieth-century life, and replaces it with a model of reality in which the universe itself may possess a type of consciousness, of which human consciousness is one expression. (shrink)

Comprehensive work with Hindi and Sanskrit commentaries on fundamentals of Sankhya philosophy.

Study on the philosophy of semantics in Tantric texts and Sanskrit grammar.

Contributed research papers on Vedic literature and Hindu philosophy.

Study with commentaries of Annambhaṭṭa's Tarkasaṅgraha compendium of the basic concepts and terminology of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophy.

I describe a pedagogical scheme devised to teach efficiently to computer scientists just enough quantum mechanics to permit them to understand the theoretical developments of the last decade going under the name of ''quantum computation.'' I then note that my offbeat approach to quantum mechanics, designed to be maximally efficacious for this specific educational purpose, is nothing other than the Copenhagen interpretation.

Tacitus writes that, by insisting that legionary legates who had not so far held the praetorship should immediately proceed to that office, Asinius Gallus ‘altius penetrare et arcana imperii temptari’. In C.Q. N.S. xvi , 327, I suggested that this demand of Gallus’ was probably probing dangerously deeply into and perhaps threatening to wreck the carefully worked-out imperial promotions system, the working of which has been examined by Birley. It is the purpose of this note to look at a (...) class='Hi'>number of examples of such irregularity, which, though not as early as the debate during the course of which Gallus made his suggestion, do at least illustrate the process later in the Julio-Claudian era. (shrink)

In this review, I provide a brief overview of the book and then make a brief statement about where I think the debate stands with respect to error theoretic moral semantics.

In this paper, I criticize the pairing of irreducible thickness with the traditional view of evaluation which says evaluation is a matter of encoding good or bad in some way. To do this, I first explicate the determination view, which holds that irreducibly thick concepts are to thin concepts as determinates are to determinables. I then show that, even if the determination view did establish irreducible thickness, it would not have proven that the evaluative is well understood as being an (...) instance of the determination relation; in order to do that, the determination view needs to show how the evaluative fit a general analysis of the determination relation. However, when the determination view attempts to fill in the analysis, we get implausible results—so implausible, I claim, that we should see the results as a reductio to the view. To generalize the criticism to any view like the determination view, I show that the same results ensue when we model the evaluative on mereology. Finally, I diagnose the general failure by claiming that the evaluative domain, as conceived by the defender of irreducible thickness, just does not have the structure to secure the tight connection between thick and thin concepts while also carving up our conceptual economy in a plausible way. (shrink)

I address a family of objections I label the _So What?_ objection to robust non-naturalist realism (or, just non-naturalism). This objection concludes that non-naturalism fails to identify the _moral properties_ in virtue of failing to explain why non-natural properties would have all the features we expect _moral properties_ to have and can be extended to provide the conclusion that the non-naturalist is therefore immoral. I argue that _So What?_ is question-begging because it disallows non-naturalists their central theoretical claim: there are (...) ethical properties iff they are fundamental properties (and, in virtue of that, non-natural). I then diagnose the error anti-non-naturalists make explicitly: those who object to non-naturalism along the lines of _So What?_ either fail to understand precisely what the theory claims or fail to understand non-naturalist motivations for going in for that theory. (shrink)

We prove that if G is a Δ 0 -definable function on the natural numbers and F = Π i = 0 n G , then F is also Δ 0 -definable. Moreover, the inductive properties of F can be proved inside the theory IΔ 0.

Mesodermal cell differentiation begins in response to an inductive interaction early in frog development. In parallel with the recent finding that certain peptide growth factors can induce mesoderm, early cellular and genetic responses to the induction have been discovered. I review here recent work on these responses, work that aims to understand how cells respond to inducers to form the complex pattern of the vertebrate mesoderm.

I review T. Ryan Byerly's treatment of the possible virtue of others-centeredness.

BACKGROUND: Serotonin transporter promoter genotype appears to increase risk for depression in the context of stressful life events. However, the effects of this genotype on measures of stress sensitivity are poorly understood. Therefore, this study examined whether 5-HTTLPR genotype was associated with negative information processing biases in early childhood. METHOD: Thirty-nine unselected seven-year-old children completed a negative mood induction procedure and a Self-Referent Encoding Task designed to measure positive and negative schematic processing. Children were also genotyped for the 5-HTTLPR gene. (...) RESULTS: Children who were homozygous for the short allele of the 5-HTTLPR gene showed greater negative schematic processing following a negative mood prime than those with other genotypes. 5-HTTLPR genotype was not significantly associated with positive schematic processing. LIMITATIONS: The sample size for this study was small. We did not analyze more recently reported variants of the 5-HTTLPR long alleles. CONCLUSIONS: 5-HTTLPR genotype is associated with negative information processing styles following a negative mood prime in a non-clinical sample of young children. Such cognitive styles are thought to be activated in response to stressful life events, leading to depressive symptoms; thus, cognitive styles may index the "stress-sensitivity" conferred by this genotype. (shrink)

tic sequenzen-kalkul of Gentzen, into rules for PCc, the classical sequenzenkalkul. We shall limit ourselves here to sequenzen or turnstile statements of the form A„A„..., A„ I- B, where A„A„..., A„(n ~ 0), and B are wffs consisting of propositional variables, zero or more of the connectives '5', "v', ' ', ')', and '=', and zero or more parentheses. One can pass from PCi to PCc by amending the intelim rules for ' a result of long standing, or by amending (...) the intelim rules for either one of.. (shrink)

We say that a ring admits elimination of quantifiers, if in the language of rings, {0, 1, +, ·}, the complete theory of R admits elimination of quantifiers. Theorem 1. Let D be a division ring. Then D admits elimination of quantifiers if and only if D is an algebraically closed or finite field. A ring is prime if it satisfies the sentence: ∀ x ∀ y ∃ z (x = 0 ∨ y = 0 ∨ xzy ≠ 0). Theorem (...) 2. If R is a prime ring with an infinite center and R admits elimination of quantifiers, then R is an algebraically closed field. Let A be the class of finite fields. Let B be the class of 2 × 2 matrix rings over a field with a prime number of elements. Let C be the class of rings of the form $GF(p^n) \bigoplus GF(p^k)$ such that either n = k or g.c.d. (n, k) = 1. Let D be the set of ordered pairs (f, Q) where Q is a finite set of primes and f: Q → A ∪ B ∪ C such that the characteristic of the ring f(q) is q. Finally, let E be the class of rings of the form $\bigoplus_{q \in Q}f(q)$ for some (f, Q) in D. Theorem 3. Let R be a finite ring without nonzero trivial ideals. Then R admits elimination of quantifiers if and only if R belongs to E. Theorem 4. Let R be a ring with the descending chain condition of left ideals and without nonzero trivial ideals. Then R admits elimination of quantifiers if and only if R is an algebraically closed field or R belongs to E. In contrast to Theorems 2 and 4, we have Theorem 5. If R is an atomless p-ring, then R is finite, commutative, has no nonzero trivial ideals and admits elimination of quantifiers, but is not prime and does not have the descending chain condition. We also generalize Theorems 1, 2 and 4 to alternative rings. (shrink)

An agent’s belief in a proposition, E0, is justified by an infinite regress of deferred justification just in case the belief that E0 is justified, and the justification for believing E0 proceeds from an infinite sequence of propositions, E0, E1, E2, etc., where, for all n ≥ 0, En+1 serves as the justification for En. In a number of recent articles, Atkinson and Peijnenburg claim to give examples where a belief is justified by an infinite regress of deferred justification. (...) I argue here that there is no reason to regard Atkinson and Peijnenburg’s examples as cases where a belief is so justified. My argument is supported by careful consideration of the grounds upon which relevant beliefs are held within Atkinson and Peijnenburg’s examples. (shrink)